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INCOMPLETELY THEORIZED AGREEMENTS:
AN UNWORKABLE THEORY OF
JUDICIAL MODESTY
Yavar Bathaee *

Much is expected from the judicial power of the United States.
Expected to possess neither force nor will,1 it must serve as a bulwark for discrete and insular minorities.2 At the same time, it is
expected to give effect to the will of the legislature.3 The demands
on the federal judiciary are far from homogenous, and at times,
they are conflicting.4 A court is expected to do justice yet receives
public criticism for engaging in “activism.”5 Yet, American law
finds its roots in a tradition of adjudication that is evolving and
flexible: the common law.6 At the heart of its charge is the obliga* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2008. B.S. Computer
Science and Engineering, University of California Davis. First and foremost, I would
like to thank Jacqueline Tsu for her loving support and kind inspiration. I am very
grateful for my parents and my sister. I would also like to thank Professor Yxta
Murray not only for her kindness and intelligence, but also for instilling in me a passion for the law. Professor Charles A. Kelbley for his patience and indispensable
guidance on this Comment. Special thanks to the Fordham Urban Law Journal staff.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 41 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
2. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
3. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (“Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge;
always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature . . . .”).
4. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), for example, featured a joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter noting that “[i]t is
tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the individual
against federal interference by the express provisions of the first eight Amendments
to the Constitution . . . . But of course this Court has never accepted that view,” and
Justice Scalia objecting to the constitutionalization of the issue, stating that the case
should be resolved, not by the judiciary, but by “citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.” Id. at 847, 979.
5. Countless newspaper articles have rebuked or addressed judicial activism in
the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Op-Ed.,
What Chief Justice Roberts Forgot in His First Term: Judicial Modesty, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2006, § 4, at 11; Morris B. Hoffman, Op-Ed., Ruling From the Head, Not the
Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, at A25; Kermit Roosevelt III, Op-Ed., Is that an
Activist Judge?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at 13.
6. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22-23
(1921) (“The common law does not work from pre-established truths of universal and
inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its method is inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars.”). Justice Cardozo referred to
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tion to safeguard the will of the legislature,7 to ensure the protection of the minority,8 and resolve particular disputes and redress
particular injuries.9
It is difficult to imagine a philosophy of law that accommodates
such a tension.10 Jurisprudence compatible with the conflicting demands on the American judiciary must seek minimalism without
impotence.11 Pluralism creates a great amount of political tension12 and must be confronted with a steadfast rule of law predicated on unshakable principles of adjudication.13 Yet, such
jurisprudence has never emerged.14 Nor would such jurisprudence
obviate the need to confront the very heart of conflict—the clash
the American tradition of common law as a “strange compound which is brewed daily
in the caldron of the courts . . . .” Id. at 10.
7. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 866.
8. The Supreme Court has protected minorities’ interests in the face of laws
seemingly predicated on animus against those minorities. See generally Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (protecting homosexuals); City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (protecting the mentally retarded).
9. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“In addition, the requirement of concrete injury confines the Judicial
Branch to its proper, limited role in the constitutional framework of Government. An
independent judiciary is held to account through its open proceedings and its reasoned judgments. In this process it is essential for the public to know what persons or
groups are invoking the judicial power, the reasons that they have brought suit, and
whether their claims are vindicated or denied. The concrete injury requirement helps
assure that there can be an answer to these questions; and, as the Court’s opinion is
careful to show, that is part of the constitutional design.”).
10. Doing so may require that a court split the difference, greatly diminishing the
value of adjudication as a means of effecting social change.
11. Sometimes a court requires flexibility to give effect to broader principles, for
example, fundamental rights. To some, an appropriate jurisprudence would “determine the ends, goals, and visions of the good life that liberal citizens pursue.” STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 5 (1990).
12. See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 334 (2007) (“[Pluralism] . . . recognize[s] the fact that
human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with
one another.”) (quoting Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY, 118, 171 (1969)).
13. When a court finds itself incompetent to resolve a dispute it refrains from adjudication. The political question doctrine, for example, stems from a need for the
judiciary to refrain from adjudicating cases where it lacks institutional competence.
See Benjamin Michael Superfine, Using the Courts to Influence the Implementation of
No Child Left Behind, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 829 (2006) (“Indeed, the concern
about judicial competency in the policy arena is much of what animates the non-justiciable political question doctrine.”).
14. This is based on the postulate that no jurisprudence can provide steadfast rules
while simultaneously reserving the flexibility required to do justice.
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of human will. One party’s will must displace another’s.15 The less
a court pronounces, the less the displacement.16 Minimalism thus
alleviates the tension inherent in adjudication. Nevertheless, a judiciary that employs minimalism to arrive at its decision decides and
substitutes its will for that of the parties before it. The extent to
which the decision binds the future depends on the scope of the
theoretical underpinnings of its decisions. A narrow decision will
be relied on far less than a decision that announces a broad
principle.
The manner and scope in which a court theorizes is critical.
When a court decides a case, it binds future courts and litigants to
its decision—but to what extent? Professor Cass Sunstein, recognizing the questionable democratic pedigree of an appointed judiciary,17 offers a jurisprudence of minimalism to fill the breach.
Sunstein’s mechanism for theoretical modesty is the “incompletely
theorized agreement,” the notion that individuals can agree on less
theorized principles to resolve cases at hand without resorting to
high-level theoretical pronouncements.18
This Comment addresses Sunstein’s minimalist regime within the
context of the Supreme Court’s adjudication of constitutional matters. This Comment argues that the less a court is held accountable
to precedent, the less viable incompletely theorized agreements become as a means of fostering agreement.
Unfettered by the constraints of inductive comparison, a court is
free to theorize. Once theorization has begun, no clear rules exist
to terminate the process. Incompletely theorized agreements are,
therefore, less viable when the Supreme Court adjudicates consti15. The jurisdictional charter of the federal courts phrases jurisdiction in the terms
of a zero sum case or controversy. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. A case or controversy, by definition, involves a set of adverse parties. Absent adversity some of the
parties may not have standing to sue or the case may not be ripe for adjudication. See
Marguerite Hogan, Comment, Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a
Guardianship Model From the Dissents in Sierra Club v. Morton, 95 CAL. L. REV. 513,
516 (2007) (noting that the contemporary view of standing embodies the notion that
the parties are adverse on the issues). This is precisely why declaratory judgment
actions and preliminary injunctions must be predicated on the threat of suit or harm.
See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 771 (2007) (noting that declaratory judgment actions must be between parties with adverse legal interests). Absent some adversity of interest between the parties, Article III of the Constitution is
not satisfied.
16. Our adversarial process ensures that most of the time for every winner on a
legal issue there is a loser.
17. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 60
(1998).
18. Id. at 4-5.
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tutional issues because the doctrine of stare decisis is particularly
weak when a court is not subject to review by a higher court and is
interpreting a foundational document.
Section I describes the derivation and nature of incompletely
theorized agreements and the role of analogical reasoning. Section
II discusses the weak effect of stare decisis when a high court interprets a supreme constitution. In such cases, the decision whether
or not to apply the doctrine of stare decisis requires a fair amount
of theorization, and such a decision must be made upon every analogical endeavor. The low-level and mid-level principles that Sunstein urges should replace ambitious theorization often require a
fair amount of theorization to apply. The alternative of strengthening the doctrine of stare decisis would confound one of the advantages of incompletely theorized agreements—flexibility. Section II
concludes by noting that the stare decisis required to facilitate incompletely theorized agreements results in defeating the benefits
of such a regime.
Section III addresses the assumption that minimal theorization
comports with traditional notions of judicial restraint and Ronald
Dworkin’s criticism of this theory. A logical effect of this problem
is that deferring theorization until necessary means that at some
point a court will be justified in engaging in more ambitious theorization. Once the court has begun theorizing, it is difficult to tell at
what point the justification ceases and a court has over-theorized.
This, in turn, may lead to even broader theorization rather than the
minimalism sought in employing incompletely theorized
agreements.
In other words, creating a gap between precedent and the point
of application will invite a court seeking to create a point of analogy between precedent and a set of given facts to fill the theoretical void. Since it is difficult to determine to what extent
theorization is more or less complete, a court will find it quite easy
to overstep its bounds once it has begun the process.
While incompletely theorized agreements may not be viable
when applied within the context of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, the project of judicial restraint is not indefensible. This Comment contends that neither incompletely theorized
agreements nor aggressive legal theorization alone are capable of
ensuring judicial minimalism and restraint. It is instead precision
in theorization rather than the degree of theorization that governs
the appropriate role of theorization in matters of constitutional
import.
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The demands placed on the federal judiciary conflict because the
institution was designed to operate in the midst of conflict.19 Ideas
must be able to compete for control of particular cases and controversies until one idea proves more meritorious than the next.20
Theoretical modesty diminishes the vitality of this process of competition and experimentation.21 Members of multi-member panels
must face the political costs of divergent decisions,22 and it is the
province of a court to constantly question our society’s most
closely held beliefs.23 These seemingly negative properties are in
fact the cornerstones of our adjudicative process and should
neither be dampened nor constrained.
I.

THE INCOMPLETELY THEORIZED AGREEMENT
ROLE OF ANALOGICAL REASONING

AND THE

Incompletely theorized agreements involve reaching a consensus
on more theoretically modest grounds to avoid conflict on broader
and more contentious issues.24 For example, a court can choose to
agree that the speech in a given case is not incitement without deciding on a general theory of First Amendment law.25 Such agreements are incompletely theorized because they need not develop
an expansive theory of constitutional law to resolve cases.26
Borrowing and inverting John Rawls’ overlapping consensus,27
that is, the notion that individuals can find agreement at higher
levels of theoretical abstraction when agreements about particulars
are untenable,28 Sunstein conceives of an agreement that is fueled
19. The purpose of an independent judiciary confirms this proposition, or else political insulation would be a moot privilege.
20. CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 40-41 (1921) (“Conflicting principles [are often] in
competition for the mastery.”).
21. Theoretical modesty in constitutional matters also works in the opposite fashion. By not pronouncing on an issue a court leaves the states to experiment by developing their own unique laws that are tailored to their localities. See, e.g., Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 291-92 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
22. Some decisions, for example, leave lower courts in disarray and states unsure
of the legality of their conduct. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(holding that arbitrary and inconsistent application of the death penalty violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution).
23. If the Constitution embodies our most closely held beliefs, the act of interpreting its provisions must often challenge and refine them.
24. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 35.
25. See Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 744-46 (1993)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning].
26. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 36.
27. See id. at 46 (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993)).
28. See id.
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by theoretically modest principles to reach consensus about particulars, rather than seeking an untenable agreement about broad abstract and often controversial principles.29 Instead of creating a
broad theory about the law prior to application, Sunstein’s incompletely theorized agreements allow resolutions to develop through
“casuistical judgments at the point of application.”30
One such form of “casuistry”31 is the process of analogical reasoning.32 In analogical reasoning, precedent is compared to the
case at hand to determine if the two cases deserve like treatment.33
Ordinarily the process of analogy requires a starting point, especially when two or more judges or justices must agree on what facts
are relevant for comparison. Sunstein points to the doctrine of
stare decisis as the starting point for the process of analogical reasoning. Precedent also binds lower courts to their superiors, leaving them little discretion to deviate from the rules of decision that
must be inferred from precedent.
High courts, on the other hand, are far less restrained. The
United States Supreme Court discretionarily selects its caseload,34
and its decisions are unreviewable,35 including its decisions about
whether or not to adhere to precedent. There is limited institutional structure, primarily the constitutional amendment process,
to police the doctrine of stare decisis. This limited structure weakens the doctrine. Stare decisis further erodes with more heated
and controversial issues.36
Sunstein argues that incompletely theorized agreements are well
suited for multi-member institutions because they allow a “convergence on particular outcomes by people unable to reach anything
29. See id. at 35.
30. Id.
31. Sunstein defines casuistry “as analysis of cases unaccompanied by rules.” Id.
32. See Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning, supra note 25, at 745.
33. Id. at 743 (“This kind of thinking has a simple structure: (1) A has characteristic X; (2) B shares that characteristic; (3) A also has characteristic Y; (4) Because A
and B share characteristic X, we conclude what is not yet known, that B shares characteristic Y as well.”).
34. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 (West 2006) (vesting certiorari jurisdiction over the
high courts of the several states).
35. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“The federal judiciary is supreme
in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . .”).
36. More settled expectations give rise to a stronger stare decisis effect. See Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 331-32 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that a “typically invoked rationale for stare decisis” is “an
unwillingness to upset settled expectations.”). Transitively, the converse implies a
weaker effect.
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like an accord on general principles,”37 without questioning each
other’s closely held values. This reduces the political cost of arriving at a consensus on controversial constitutional issues.38
The United States Supreme Court regularly reexamines its precedent.39 While “incompletely theorized agreements are well
adapted to a system that should or must take precedents as fixed
points,”40 a high court interpreting the supreme law of the land is
under no such obligation and is less likely to be compatible with
incompletely theorized agreements.41
Sunstein also favors a presumption against high-level theories in
light of the federal judiciary’s lack of democratic accountability.42
Sunstein assumes that a system of low-level and mid-level principles will be more advantageous “over more ambitious methods,
since ambitious thinkers, in order to reach horizontal and vertical
coherence, will probably be forced to disregard many decided
cases.”43 Low-level and mid-level principles, however, may simply
defer theorization until deferral is no longer possible and invite an
ascent in theoretical ambition. Once this process has begun, it is
difficult to determine whether a court has over-theorized.
II.

THE FLAWED ROLE OF STARE DECISIS IN INCOMPLETELY
THEORIZED AGREEMENTS

Professor Sunstein asserts that incompletely theorized agreements thrive when there is preexisting consensus on the value of
37. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1747 (1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements].
38. See id. at 1748-49.
39. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2721 (2007); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“We have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal
underpinnings.”).
40. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 37, at 1750.
41. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 J. CONST. L. 155, 156
(2006) (“If all legal reasoning should be instrumentalist, then, it would seem to follow,
reasoning about constitutional precedents should focus on policy or a balancing of
relevant interests. The . . . shaping idea is the Supreme Court’s well-settled doctrine
that it has unfettered power to overrule its own prior decisions.”). See also Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command;
rather it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the
latest decision . . . . This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such
cases correction through legislative action is practically impossible.”) (internal citations omitted).
42. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 60.
43. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 37, at 1750.
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prior cases as precedent.44 By accepting prior cases as unrevisable,
a court can employ low-level principles such as analogical reasoning to resolve the case at hand without requiring the court to develop a broader theory or reinvent the wheel by examining the
theoretical underpinnings of prior case law.45 A preexisting consensus that Brown v. Board of Education 46 was rightly decided renders the court free to concentrate on whether a similar case is
adequately analogous to receive the same treatment. Apart from
agreeing on the correctness of precedent, Sunstein notes that
courts often take prior cases as correct under the doctrine of stare
decisis,47 thereby providing the beginnings of an incompletely theorized agreement and paving the way for the use of analogical reasoning.48 For example, one could disagree with the Court’s
decision in Lawrence v. Texas,49 but nevertheless afford the case
stare decisis effect.
Utilizing precedent as a starting point for consensus, however,
depends on the existence of either an institutional constraint that
forces a judge to accept precedent as a fixed point of validity or a
strong stare decisis effect to force a judge to defer to precedent
despite her beliefs about its correctness.50 Constraints that facilitate analogical reasoning or other low-level means of resolving a
dispute become anemic when a judge is the final expositor of the
law and the law being interpreted is foundational. The Supreme
Court, for example, is bound by no other institution when interpreting the Constitution and need not treat adherence to precedent
as an “inexorable command.”51
When stare decisis is weakened even slightly, Professor Sunstein’s incompletely theorized agreements face a profound barrier
because analogical reasoning would require both a consensus on
44. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 40.
45. See id. (“[T]he principle of stare decisis, which instructs courts to respect precedent, helps produce incompletely theorized agreements, and it helps avoid constant
struggle over basic principle. It serves this function precisely because it prevents people from having to build the world again, and together, every time a dispute arises.”).
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 40.
48. See id.
49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
50. See Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning, supra note 25, at 778 (“Some of the fixed
points in law are precedents reached by others, not judgments genuinely accepted by
oneself. These points may be fixed either because the legal culture genuinely renders
them unrevisable (for the particular judge on, say, a lower court), or because the
principle of stare decisis imposes a strong barrier to revision.”).
51. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
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whether a given precedent is analogous and whether the precedent
should be given stare decisis effect at all. Sunstein depends on
stare decisis to render analogical reasoning a viable means of
achieving incompletely theorized agreements.52 He notes that analogical reasoning “depends on a degree of commonality.”53 To begin comparing one case to another, one must agree on the facts
relevant for comparison and which cases are analogous.54 Sunstein
notes that because the “[l]aw imposes greater constraints on the
analogical process,”55 individuals are likely to agree that precedent
should be respected despite their disagreement with its correctness.
Sunstein urges that this phenomenon will occur because “the principle of stare decisis so requires.”56
Because Professor Sunstein relies on the doctrine of stare decisis
to provide the starting point for proceeding by analogy towards an
incompletely theorized agreement,57 such agreements are vulnerable to criticism on four grounds within the context of constitutional
law. First, stare decisis is particularly weak in the Supreme Court
because supremacy of an interpreting institution prevents its choice
to depart from adherence to precedent from being reviewed.58
Second, without a strong stare decisis effect, the lower court faces
the decision to overrule precedent every time it encounters precedent,59 which, in turn, requires a consensus on whether the doctrine
should be invoked. The decision whether to apply precedent in
52. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 40 (“[S]tare decisis . . . helps produce incompletely theorized agreements, and it helps to avoid constant struggle over basic
principle.”).
53. See Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning, supra note 25, at 770.
54. See id. at 774.
55. Id. at 770.
56. Id.
57. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 40.
58. Although a court must yield to legislative overrides on non-constitutional matters, constitutional matters become inextricably intertwined with the Constitution itself. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever
since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable
feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of
the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States ‘any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’
Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath
taken pursuant to Art. VI, ¶3 ‘to support this Constitution.’ ”).
59. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER of INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 83 (1997) (questioning how Justice
Scalia formulates rules for “selective invocation” of stare decisis) [hereinafter SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION].
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itself requires a guiding principle.60 Third, even if the court can
establish fixed points of law, the process of analogical reasoning, a
principle that Sunstein notes as a viable substitute for more ambitious theorization,61 does not in and of itself produce theoretically
modest outcomes. This is because analogies require the adoption
of theory embodied in the precedent or the development of theory
to explain precedent prior to engaging in analogical reasoning.
Fourth, modifying stare decisis to facilitate incompletely theorized
agreements might create inflexibility and rigidity in a court’s
jurisprudence.
A.

The Effects of Weak Stare Decisis Doctrine on Incompletely
Theorized Agreements and Theoretical Modesty

Stare decisis is by no means completely consistent or even a
strong barrier to revision. Justice Scalia, for one, has opined that
“the doctrine of stare decisis has appreciably eroded. Prior decisions that even the cleverest mind cannot distinguish can nowadays
simply be overruled.”62 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence supports this proposition.63
While stare decisis applies most of the time, even the mode of
determining whether to invoke the doctrine provides insight into
the viability of stare decisis as a facilitator of analogical reasoning.
When a court is bound by a weak form of stare decisis,64 its decisions to afford precedent stare decisis effect is a pronouncement on
the precedent’s validity.65 As Professor Tribe has pointed out in
60. See id.
61. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 38 (“People might think that A is like B and
covered by the same low-level principle, without agreeing on a general theory to explain why the low-level principle is sound. They agree on the matter of similarity,
without agreeing on a large-scale account of what makes the two things similar.”).
62. See SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 59, at 12.
63. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (2004) (“Stare decisis is not an
inexorable command in the area of constitutional law . . . .”) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 211 (2003) (“ ‘[T]he doctrine of stare decisis
is most compelling’ when the Court confronts ‘a pure question of statutory construction.’ ”) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 502 U.S.
197, 205 (1991)); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (“The sheer diversity of
today’s opinions persuades me that the theory of unenumerated parental rights underlying these three cases has small claim to stare decisis protection. A legal principle
that can be thought to produce such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case
before us here is not a legal principle that has induced substantial reliance.”) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
64. This is as opposed to a strong form of the doctrine that is manifest in inferior
courts.
65. Some cases are ignored rather than explicitly overruled. See, e.g., Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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another context, even rules about when to invoke the doctrine of
stare decisis may depend on personal value judgments.66
Absent a principle that imposes a strong stare decisis effect, a
judicial decision might incorporate judgments on the validity of
precedent itself and, in turn, incorporate theory into a decision arrived at analogically. A simple thought experiment illustrates this
point. Consider a provision that states the following: “No dogs
shall be allowed in parks.”67 The court has previously held that a
bomb-sniffing dog that entered a park to detect an explosive device
did not violate the provision. The issue presented in the current
case is whether a seeing-eye dog’s entrance into a park in the
course of its duties is similar enough to be afforded the same disposition. The court must first decide whether the bomb-sniffing dog
case is precedent creating a stare decisis effect.
The threshold inquiry into whether to afford the bomb-sniffing
dog case stare decisis effect illustrates two critical points. First, the
degree of theorization already developed in the previous case may
dictate whether a judge will overrule or distinguish the case from
the one at hand. Second, if the precedent is modestly theorized,
the court will have to develop some theory embedded in the precedent that either connects it to the case at hand or distinguishes
them from each other. Regardless of which occurs, theory is conserved. If the bomb-sniffing dog case held that the dog did not
violate the provision because of the potential loss of human life
that would result if the dog was denied the opportunity to detect
the explosive, the seeing-eye dog case would not be very analogous
because the loss of human life is not at issue. If however, the reasoning were that the dog was allowed in the park because it served
some specific purpose or function, then the seeing-eye dog case
would be more analogous. As more generalized reasoning is used
to explain the holding, the more cases will be analogous.
If the bomb-sniffing dog were allowed to enter the park because
it served a specific purpose or function, another case which involves a dog entering a park to entertain children might force the
court to go back and overrule its precedent because the holding
might have been so broad as to leave too many cases analogous.
66. See SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 59, at 83.
67. This hypothetical is in honor of H. L. A. Hart’s similar thought experiment
about vehicles in the park. See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958) (“The insight of this school may be
presented in the following example. A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the
public park.”).
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Importantly, the process of analogy, and certainly the outcome of
analogy, depends on the reasoning of each case. In addition, a
stare decisis effect that is not absolute requires theory about stare
decisis and the precedent itself to determine whether to invoke the
doctrine.
B.

Analogical Reasoning Requires Either Ex Ante
or Ex Post Theorization

Even assuming a modestly theorized precedent, a court will have
to provide a minimum amount of theory to explain the precedent
before applying it to another case. Failing to articulate a theoretical
basis for a modest holding would result in absurd outcomes. It
would be absurd to conclude that because the dogs in both cases
were German Shepherds and both instances occurred at 5:00 PM
that the two cases are analogous. One cannot determine whether
the cases are truly analogous without articulating why such factors
are important or even relevant.68 Sunstein recognizes and restates
this objection to the use of analogical reasoning instead of more
ambitious theorization:
Everything is a little bit similar to, or different from, everything
else. Perhaps better: Everything is similar in infinite ways to
everything else, and also different from everything else in the
same number of ways. At the very least one needs a set of criteria to engage in analogical reasoning. Otherwise one has no
idea what is analogous to what.
By themselves, factual situations tell us little until we impose
some sort of pattern on them. We say that something is like
something else only because we have a principle that tells us so
(or because we simply perceive the world this way). If this is
true, it might seem better simply to identify the principle and
the criteria, if we have them, rather than to proceed through
analogies.69

The process of analogizing requires minimal consensus as to the
relevance and weight afforded to each point of comparison. Sunstein argues that the doctrine of stare decisis creates this required
consensus, and that courts are one step further in reaching an ultimate consensus based on low-level principles such as analogical
reasoning.70 This, however, does not prove true when one examines the process of analogical reasoning itself. It becomes impossi68. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 69 (2006).
69. See Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning, supra note 25, at 774.
70. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 40.
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ble to make analogical comparisons without relying, to some
extent, on articulated theory in a prior case or by developing one’s
own theory about the precedent prior to applying it. The principles
and criteria Sunstein refers to are nothing more than theorization
in disguise.
Without theorizing, one cannot determine which points in each
case are important points of analogy and which ones are collateral.
Theory defines the contours of the analogical inquiry. Without
first determining which facts were critical to a previous case’s outcome, not only can one not decide which facts to compare the next
case to, but one will also find it difficult to check the soundness of
the comparison.71 The point of analogical reasoning is to determine, first, whether two situations share similar attributes and, second, to determine whether they should be treated alike because the
same underlying principles apply.
Sunstein’s response is that “criteria . . . will emerge largely from
the process of comparing various cases.”72 If criteria emerge, cohesion with the criteria tells us nothing more than the fact that a present case fits with the rest. A set of criteria that is inductively
derived, however, does not determine whether the outcome itself is
correct, or whether the pattern, theory, or principle that emerged
from the comparison of cases is desirable. Even Sunstein notes
that the “criteria will not have any source other than what we
think.”73 But what we think can only manifest itself subconsciously
in a line of precedent. Ensuring both cohesion and correctness requires analogical adherence to theory and some degree of a priori
theorization.
Ronald Dworkin made this point by noting, “analogy without
theory is blind.”74 Theory is either embedded in precedent or developed to explain the precedent that facilitates analogical reasoning. The decision to adopt precedent as a fixed point of law is
either an adoption of the precedent’s theoretical underpinnings or
a promise to explain by theorizing why it in fact embodies a principle worth propagating.
Sunstein’s assertion that “[p]rinciples are thus both generated
and tested through confrontation with particular cases”75 is certainly true, but not because there is anything special about anal71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 69.
See Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning, supra note 25, at 775.
Id.
DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 69.
Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning, supra note 25, at 775.
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ogy.76 The theory developed prior to employing the analogy is the
genesis of the principles. Analogy generates principles because to
employ analogy, one must develop or articulate principles, just as
going out into the cold makes one warmer because one must put
on a coat, scarf, hat, and gloves prior to doing so. One is warmer
not because it is warm outside, but because one is forced to do
things that will keep one warm.
It is misleading to say that principles emerge through particular
cases because principles can be freestanding but facts are of ambiguous relevance absent principles. Predefined principles determine
which facts are relevant and should be used for comparison. Principles also determine whether the ultimate outcome of the analogy
is sound. Therefore, principles must be defined a priori, because
they do not emerge simply through the analogical process.77
76. Professor Sunstein conversely notes that there “is no special magic in theories
or abstractions, and that theories are simply the (humanly constructed) means by
which people make sense of their ethical and political worlds.” Sunstein, Incompletely
Theorized Agreements, supra note 37, at 1762. If one accepts this characterization of
theory, then there is, in turn, nothing profound about the analogical process either. It
too can be characterized as simplistically as Sunstein characterizes theory: as merely
the means (humanly constructed, of course) in which people apply their theories to
particulars. This line of characterization should be abrogated. One must see theory
for what it is: an attempt not only to make sense of our ethical and political worlds,
but also to define them.
The process of creating theory, whether right or wrong, begins the normative process. It allows us to determine what fits and what needs to be changed to fit within
our theoretical constructs. Ronald Dworkin has criticized a similar notion that language used to express moral reality, in fact, creates moral reality. Cf. DWORKIN, supra
note 68, at 58. Dworkin rejects Judge Posner’s flirtation with the theory that “language creates rather than . . . report[s] our moral universe.” Id. Dworkin rejects such
a theory on the grounds that such a construct would imply that there is no objective
truth in moral matters. Dworkin continues by stating that “if the argument that there
is no objective truth about moral matters is sound, its consequence is not that there is
nevertheless a truth for our community, but rather that there is a distinct truth for
each of us, and we cannot sustain a theoretical approach to adjudication on that basis.” Id. at 59. The notion that theory also serves to define our political and ethical
worlds in addition to describing them may be vulnerable to Dworkin’s metaphysical
critique.
It is true that a divergent theory will not alter the state of one’s political and ethical
worlds, but it is also true that by establishing a theoretical benchmark, an ultimate
goal of cohesion with a broader theory, one will necessarily begin comparing the current sate of affairs with the ideal. In the minimum theory begins a normative analysis
that allows actors to identify and correct anomalies. The ultimate picture, once a high
degree of theoretical cohesion is achieved, is a picture similar to the theory itself. This
is essentially how theory helps shape our moral and ethical worlds, rather than merely
help us make sense of them.
77. Men cannot live by induction alone. If neither deduction nor induction alone
will suffice, another governing principle of rationality must be at work. See Hart,
supra note 67, at 608 (“In this area men cannot live by deduction alone. And it fol-

\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-5\FUJ502.txt

unknown

Seq: 15

28-NOV-07

2007] INCOMPLETELY THEORIZED AGREEMENTS

11:16

1471

Other low-level principles offered by Sunstein will also fail on
similar grounds. For example, desuetude is the principle that laws
seldom enforced should not stand.78 While desuetude may not require theorization, it is not a low-level principle but rather representative of a broader theory about the legitimacy of laws that are
rarely enforced.79 Professor Prakash argues that desuetude will
often have the unintended consequence of striking down more statutes than contemplated.80 This might be the result of its theoretical
underpinnings. Sunstein refers to utilitarianism and Kantianism as
examples of high-level theories,81 but desuetude can easily be characterized as utilitarianism. Either desuetude cannot be classified as
a minimalist principle or no principle can obviate the need for theory. The latter seems more probable in light of the failure of analogical reasoning to provide a minimalist substitute.
C.

The Question of Whether or Not to Follow Precedent is
Implicit in Every Application of Precedent

When a court faces the option of overruling a case, a threshold
inquiry into whether to adhere to precedent is implicit. This is
analogous to the implicit search for an exception to the application
of a rule.82 The option not to adhere to precedent creates a point
of decision, and such a decision cannot be made without reference
to the cases themselves. The court does not merely look to the
facts of each case but to their theoretical underpinnings when arriving at its decisions.
An illustrative example arises from the Supreme Court’s intergovernmental immunity jurisprudence.83 The Supreme Court in
lows that if legal arguments and legal decisions of penumbral questions are to be
rational, their rationality must lie in something other than a logical relation to
premises.”).
78. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude,
Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 27-28 (2003).
79. See id.
80. See Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-Wing
Law Professors are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207, 2216 (2006) (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)).
81. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 37 (“We might consider, as conspicuous examples of high-level theories, Kantianism and utilitarianism . . . .”).
82. See id. at 125 (“Any judgment on this matter depends on a moral or political
claim about relevant differences and relevant similarities—between the case where an
exception has been or would be found and the case now under consideration.”).
83. Intergovernmental immunity arises in certain realms of regulation in which
both the state and federal governments are sovereign and neither can dominate.
JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION: HOW
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National League of Cities v. Usery 84 stated that even when exercising its commerce power,85 Congress could not “impair the States’
. . . ability to function effectively in a federal system.”86 The Court
held that the Fair Labor Standards Act87 “displace[d] the States’
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.”88 Just nine years later, the Court in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 89 began its analysis of
a similarly situated case by examining the workability of the test
articulated in National League of Cities.90 In National League of
Cities, the Court articulated several facts that were germane to the
holding in Garcia.
The National League Court paid particular attention to the fact
that minimum wage and overtime laws forced the California Highway Patrol to cut its training time for its officers in half,91 and that
the City of Clovis had to eliminate its internship program.92 These
facts, by themselves, mean nothing. What makes them significant
is that they embody a restructuring of traditional government services because of the federal minimum wage and overtime law.93
The restructuring is significant because the Tenth Amendment prohibits federal intrusion into areas that are traditionally within the
purview of the state.94 The precedent would be indeterminate if
the Court simply compared the facts without importing the theories lending significance to the facts and measuring whether the
facts in a case before them comported with those theories.95
The Supreme Court in Garcia could have employed such a factual comparison, but instead, the Court noted that the test articulated in National League of Cities had produced uncertainty in
lower court application.96 The Court began to analyze the theory
behind the rule itself, just as it would have if it chose to employ an
THE SUPREME COURT HAS RULED ON ISSUES FROM ABORTION TO ZONING 236-37
(1999).
84. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
86. 426 U.S. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
87. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216 (West 2000).
88. 426 U.S. at 852.
89. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
90. See id. at 545.
91. See 426 U.S. at 846-47.
92. See id. at 847.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 842 (noting the Tenth Amendment as the source of the limits the
courts imposed on the Commerce Clause power).
95. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 69.
96. See 469 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1985).
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analogical process or other low-level principle of decision. Ultimately, the Court attacked the test itself,97 which used history to
determine whether the regulation impinges on an area of state law
traditionally governed by the states, because it would have prevented the states from functioning as legislative laboratories.98
D.

The Factors Considered in Determining Whether or Not to
Overrule Precedent Require a Court to Examine
the Validity and Policy of the
Precedent in Question

The Garcia Court overruled National League, deciding not to afford it stare decisis effect, and concluded that the National League
test was unworkable.99 The test was unworkable because of its stifling effect on state legislative experimentation coupled with
vagueness that forced arbitrary line drawing.100 The Court began
by asking whether to afford National League stare decisis effect at
all based on utilitarian considerations, instead of an analogical
analysis of the facts.
The Court considered the practical consequences of employing
the National League test and the theoretical core that would be
binding through stare decisis.101 The Supreme Court considers specific factors when overruling precedent.102 These factors force the
Court to examine the purpose and effect of precedent.103 The Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey 104 noted the following about adherence to precedent:
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect
for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. At the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its
enforcement was for that very reason doomed. Rather, when
this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customa97. See id. 545-46.
98. See id. at 546 (“The science of government . . . is the science of experiment,
and the States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment if they
must pay an added price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by
taking up functions that an earlier day and a different society left in private hands.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
99. See id. at 531.
100. See id. at 546-47.
101. See id. at 546.
102. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
103. See id.
104. Id.
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rily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior
decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.105

E.

The Decision to Invoke the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Requires Theorization About the
Precedents in Question

A series of prudential considerations are embedded in every decision to afford precedent stare decisis effect (or the decision not
to).106 The prudential concerns focus on the correctness of prior
precedent, not just the cost benefit analysis described in Casey.107
Factors in the stare decisis analysis include the workability of the
previous standard and whether time has left the precedent “a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society.”108 These considerations
are embedded in each invocation of stare decisis. Generally, questions of unworkability or obsolescence are forays into the underlying policies of precedent.109 Determining whether precedent
should be considered a point for analogical reasoning necessarily
prevents theoretical modesty because the inquiry itself requires
theorization.
F.

Stare Decisis Does Not Provide the Necessary Barrier to
Revision Required to Reach Incompletely Theorized
Agreements Through Analogical Reasoning

There is no strong presumption that previous cases are to be
taken as axioms of law. Prior to analogical reasoning, a court must
decide whether it should or should not reexamine the applicability
of the precedent; yet a court cannot make a decision on the precedent without first examining the theoretical underpinnings of the
precedent. The opportunity for what Dworkin refers to as “justificatory ascent,”110 occurs every time courts make decisions about
invoking stare decisis.111 When a court is not required to take a
precedent as a fixed point, the vital distinction Sunstein makes be105. Id. at 854-55.
106. See id. at 854.
107. Cf. id.
108. Id. at 855.
109. These considerations are no doubt also policy concerns. Part of the Court’s
charge is to ensure that lower courts have adequate guidance to apply the standards it
articulates.
110. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 53.
111. This phenomenon will be discussed in Section IV, infra.
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tween legal and moral analogical reasoning dissipates. Sunstein
notes that “unlike morality, in which revisability is a key aspect for
reflective equilibrium the law tends to fix many particular judgments.”112 If one agrees that stare decisis is especially weak when a
court is the ultimate arbiter on constitutional interpretation, precedent is inherently reviewable through the decision of whether or
not to invoke the doctrine of stare decisis at all. It is especially
difficult to apply theoretical modesty to constitutional
interpretation.
Sunstein asserts that “stare decisis imposes a strong barrier to
revision.”113 Assuming this is true in lower courts, the Supreme
Court’s adhesion to stare decisis is a matter of policy, not an inexorable command,114 nor a strong barrier to revision. Absent a
strong stare decisis effect, courts lack a baseline of consensus and,
in turn, a starting point for the process of analogical reasoning.
The necessary commonality that Sunstein requires for analogical
reasoning only exists if there is a conscious choice to uphold the
theoretical underpinnings of precedent by following its line of
reasoning.
Absent a baseline agreement about whether a precedent should
receive stare decisis effect, theorization is required to establish a
prior case as a fixed point of law. As this Comment mentioned
above, theory is required to analogically connect two cases;115 the
theory is either implicit in the precedent or created to explain the
precedent. Moreover, theory is required to decide whether precedent is unworkable or whether it should receive stare decisis effect
at all.116
For Professor Sunstein’s incompletely theorized agreements to
play a viable role in constitutional jurisprudence, the doctrine of
stare decisis itself must be treated as a fixed point.117 Stare decisis
must be an inductive base case, an axiom of law. It must provide
the initial point of consensus to pave the way for low-level principles to fuel incompletely theorized agreements.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See
Id.
See
See
See
See

Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning, supra note 25, at 778.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
supra Section II.C.
supra note 82 and accompanying text.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 40.
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Strengthening Stare Decisis to Accommodate Incompletely
Theorized Agreements May Constrict the Judiciary’s
Ability to Interpret the Constitution

Strengthening stare decisis to accommodate incompletely theorized agreements might create unduly harsh rules, a lack of judicial
flexibility, and absurdly broad exceptions to narrowly applicable
rules. This is because strong stare decisis effect would require
greater adherence to theorized precedent. Sunstein, however, describes these effects as the product of excessive theorization: “A
completely theorized judgment would be unable to accommodate
changes in facts or values. If the legal culture really did attain a
theoretical end-state, it would become too rigid and calcified; we
would know what we thought about everything. This would disserve posterity.”118
While this may be true of complete theorization, theoretical ambition may have the opposite effect. Incompletely theorized agreements require strong stare decisis effect.119 Sunstein notes that
“stare decisis . . . helps produce incompletely theorized agreements
. . . because it prevents people from having to build the world
again, and together, every time a dispute arises.”120 The same
force that establishes the fixed points that Sunstein needs in order
to employ a low-level principle of decision also binds the hands of
the court.121 Whereas, in the midst of weaker stare decisis effect,
ambitious theorization can be easily revised because barriers to revision are lax.122
Sometimes the correct decision cannot be reached analogically.
This is particularly true if at some point in the analogical chain one
decision was erroneously theorized (even if it was modestly theorized).123 Ambitious theorization with few barriers to revision will
allow a court to simply discard the bad theory and develop a new
one.124
To facilitate incompletely theorized agreements in constitutional
law, the effect of stare decisis would have to become rigidly strong.
Such a congealed stare decisis effect is likely to be untenable.
Given the finality of law, it is far more realistic to ambitiously theo118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 41.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 40.
See id. at 41.
See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 70.
Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 17.
See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 70; SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 54.
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rize while maintaining a weaker stare decisis effect. Sunstein’s criticism of theory producing rigidity125 only holds if one assumes the
existence of stare decisis effect strong enough to mobilize incompletely theorized agreements.
Dworkin points out that “theoretical explicitness may make it
easier to identify mistakes, and may also facilitate large-scale
changes when the declared theories of the past are themselves
identified as mistakes . . . for example, of the precedents of the
Lochner era.”126
Theory provides a framework for evaluating whether or not a
particular case fits with other cases addressing similar issues.127 If
justice demands an outcome contrary to theory, then the theory
must be wrong. Otherwise, the theory will attempt to subsume the
case at hand into its synthesized scheme of cases.128 When employed in conjunction with the weak stare decisis effect typically
found in the jurisprudence of a high court, an erroneous theory can
easily be revised and an error more easily detected.
Incompletely theorized agreements, therefore, rely on a strong
stare decisis effect that would be imprudent or even perhaps untenable when a court is a high court with constitutional supremacy.
Moreover, the imposition of strong stare decisis effect would be
devastating to the court’s ability to modify erroneous theorization.
For incompletely theorized agreements to play a role in constitutional interpretation, the theory must be reconciled with the weak
stare decisis effect inherent in the final exposition of the law.
H.

The Problem of Theoretical Ascent

At some point, after examining a string of cases developed and
resolved analogically, a pattern is likely to emerge.129 Sunstein refers to the search for such a pattern as the phenomenon of “conceptual ascent.”130 One reason to search for broader principles in
case law is to check the validity of the precedent.131 Sunstein notes
that “there is a problem of explaining our considered judgments
about particular cases, in order to see whether they are not just a
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 41.
DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 70.
id.
id.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 51.
id.
id.
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product of accident, and at some point the law will want to offer
that explanation.”132
The greatest danger in proceeding by theoretically modest analogical reasoning is the possibility that the agreement reached is
erroneous, truncated, or merely accidental.133 To safeguard against
this error, Sunstein argues that a “distinguished judge . . . will experience a kind of ‘conceptual ascent,’ in which the more or less isolated and small low-level principle is finally made part of a more
general theory.”134 The role of theorization in Sunstein’s model of
incompletely theorized agreements is, therefore, an afterthought.
This ascent in theorization is a natural product of inductive reasoning. Individual cases are examined in order to develop a
broader principle.135 What Sunstein fails to realize is that the
broader principles do not naturally emerge from the case law, but
are developed incrementally with each analogy between cases. The
distinction between theory as the progeny of analogy and as vehicle of analogy appears to be splitting hairs; within this distinction
lies a subtle point about the whole endeavor of theoretical modesty. Importantly, if theorization is inevitable, a workable jurisprudence must entertain a certain amount of theorization rather than
sustain the illusion that low-level principles are in fact doing most
of the heavy lifting. Determining at what point to theorize is a
crucial inquiry that resolves the dispute between proceeding by
theoretically modest or robust inductive reasoning.
A common objection to a presumption in favor of theoretical
modesty is that one cannot determine, in advance, the level of theorization required to resolve a given case.136 Dworkin articulated
this objection by noting that one cannot limit the scope of inquiry
in advance and, in turn, cannot predict when and to what extent a
justificatory ascent137 (a phenomenon similar to conceptual ascent)
occurs.138

132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 55 (“We can all think of other decisions in
which judges found themselves drawn upward in a justificatory ascent they may not
have anticipated when they began to think about the case at hand.”).
137. See id. at 53, 55.
138. See id. at 68 (“[One] can set no a priori limit to the justificatory ascent into
which a problem will draw them.”).
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THEORETICAL MODESTY AND THE PHENOMENON
OF CONCEPTUAL ASCENT

This section will examine two problems. First, the difference between conceptual ascent as a natural by-product of the inductive
process and the development of theory as one proceeds by analogy.
Second, that Dworkin’s critique of Sunstein’s regime of theoretical
modesty139 is not necessarily fatal to the project of judicial
minimalism, particularly in matters of constitutional law.
A.

Conceptual Ascent as a Natural By-product
of Inductive Reasoning

Eventually a line of analogy forms a larger picture: analogous
points become illustrative of a broader theory.140 The very nature
of inductive reasoning, which proceeds by examining particulars to
develop the general,141 is amenable to theorization after a series of
specific data points are available for analysis. Sunstein refers to
this process as conceptual ascent.142 Some characterize the phenomenon as the mode “by which a relatively particularized issue or
principle is made part of a more general theory.”143
The relevant question is whether this is the proper point of theorization or whether one should theorize between cases to establish
an analogy between them. Dworkin recognized a principle problem with treating analogy as a means of avoiding theorization.144
“[A]nalogy is a way of stating a conclusion, not a way of reaching
one, and theory must do the real work.”145 He explores this concept by noting:
Would holding the drug manufacturers all liable be more like
holding people liable who actually do cause damage or more
like seeking out people who had nothing to do with an accident
at all and making them pay its costs? Is burning your own flag
more like making a speech on Hyde Park Corner or assaulting
people with offensive insults? . . . We cannot even begin to answer those questions without a deep expedition into theory:
without asking basic questions about the connection between
139. See id. at 66-72.
140. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 51.
141. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 48-49 (3d ed. 1997).
142. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 51.
143. Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1601, 1656 (2000).
144. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 69.
145. See id.
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causation and responsibility, or why the liberty of speech is of
special importance, or how the intrinsic value of human life is
best understood and expressed. Sunstein understands this.146

Dworkin notes that “the method of analogy requires recourse to
general principles.”147 Sunstein’s rejoinder is that when doing so,
one can resort to mid-level principles rather than high-level theories.148 But how can one can determine what principles are midlevel and what principles are high-level?149 It is this problem that
provides the basis of perhaps the most devastating criticisms of
proceeding by modestly theorized analogy. If one cannot tell the
difference between a high-level principle and a lesser-theorized
principle, how does one limit the amount of theorization in advance? In Dworkin’s own words, requiring one to make a distinction between such principles requires one to impose an “a priori
constraint on legal reflection.”150 This legal reflection is what
Dworkin refers to as justificatory ascent.151
This difficulty in setting a priori limits to the phenomenon of justificatory ascent counsels against using theoretically modest analogies to connect cases. Many think that proceeding by analogy
limits judicial discretion.152 Judicial restraint may require that a
court theorize no more than required to resolve a case, but theoretical modesty may leave a court no choice other than to impose
some theory on minimally defined precedent to proceed by analogy. Once a court begins to theorize, the risk of judicial indiscretion is at its greatest.
Dworkin’s statement, that one cannot predict the scope of theorization required to resolve a case before inquiry,153 points out this
very problem.154 When a court’s precedent is theoretically impoverished, a foray into theorization is to some extent justified. The
less theory that is embedded in the precedent, the more theorization is required to enable analogical reasoning.
Because the lack of theorization along each point of precedent
requires a court to identify which points of comparison are impor146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. See id. (“[I]s a political theory explaining why speech is particularly important
a ‘mid-level’ theory or something higher or lower?”).
150. See id. at 68.
151. See id.
152. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 45.
153. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 53-54.
154. See id.
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tant and why,155 employing analogical reasoning, while seeking to
apply lower-level principles, invites and perhaps defers theorization when each case is applied as precedent. Theorization upon
occasional conceptual ascent defers theorization to another court.
By the time the need for conceptual ascent arises, the justification
for broader theorization is so great it becomes difficult to tell
whether a court has overstepped its bounds.
The Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence illustrates this point. When a court attempts to search for a fundamental right or liberty interest under the Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments,156 it is faced with a decision
about how it should articulate the fundamental right.157 The scope
of the right determines whether the court finds a derivative of that
right in a potentially analogous case. When a court proceeds by
modestly defining the fundamental right or liberty interest in question, it defers theorization until conceptual ascent is necessary.
For example, the Court’s narrow definition of rights in Griswold
v. Connecticut 158 and Eisenstadt v. Baird 159 left a fairly large gap
between a fundamental right to birth control and a fundamental
right to an abortion.160 To make the cases analogous, theoretical
155. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
157. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (“Sodomy was a
criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen
States when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In
fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of
Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and
between consenting adults.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973) (“We are told
that at the time of the Persian Empire abortifacients were known and that criminal
abortions were severely punished. We are also told, however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as well as in the Roman Era, and that it was resorted to without
scruple. The Ephesian, Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears to have been generally opposed to Rome’s prevailing free-abortion
practices. He found it necessary to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the procedure advisable. Greek
and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted
in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father’s
right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion.”) (internal citations
omitted).
158. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
159. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
160. The court’s description of the relation between Griswold, Eistenstadt and Roe
illustrates this point. The Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas noted:
The opinions in Griswold and Eisenstadt were part of the background for the
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
As is well known, the case involved a challenge to the Texas law prohibiting
abortions, but the laws of other States were affected as well. Although the
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ascent is necessary. One must characterize the precedent as establishing a right to reproductive autonomy or the right to decide
whether to “bear or beget a child”161 rather than a right to birth
control. Refusing to articulate the right broadly in the precedent
led to the highly theorized decision in Roe v. Wade.162 Roe established a theorized right to reproductive autonomy, and installed a
rigid trimester system to govern the right it established.163
The same highly theorized right in Roe became an even more
theorized fundamental right in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Although Casey arguably curtailed the right in Roe,164 it is not a more
theoretically modest decision. Casey established the following
characterization of the right to reproductive autonomy:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.165

The same language was quoted in Lawrence v. Texas as creating
a liberty interest to sexual or perhaps even personal autonomy.166
The point of discretion was between Griswold and Roe. Courts are
better off dealing with the scope of the right they contemplate
while deciding the case and articulating specific limits at that time.
This is a more effective means of limiting judicial discretion down
the road. Awaiting conceptual ascent does not promote judicial reCourt held the woman’s rights were not absolute, her right to elect an abortion did have real and substantial protection as an exercise of her liberty
under the Due Process Clause. The Court cited cases that protect spatial
freedom and cases that go well beyond it. Roe recognized the right of a
woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the protection of liberty under the Due Process
Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining
the rights of the person.
539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003). The Court characterizes the right as protecting a right to
“spatial freedom” and the ultimate abortion right derived from the cases in Roe as a
right to “make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny . . . .” Id.
161. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
162. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. See id. at 161-66.
164. See Joseph F. Kobylka, Tales From the Blackmun Papers: A Fuller Appreciation of Harry Blackmun’s Judicial Legacy, 70 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1116 (2005).
165. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
166. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
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straint but produces large analogical gaps between precedents that
create the opportunity for a later court to theorize. A court’s
power over its successor courts terminates upon articulating its reasoning for deciding a case.167
Articulation and theorization do not have to be ambitious but
should be precise. The argument, that a court narrows the possibility of judicial activism by narrowing the right it finds in the Constitution, is fallacious. While a narrow but well-defined right is less
likely to receive expansive application in later cases, simply defining a right in its most particular form may invite theoretical ascent
further down the road. Justice Scalia subscribes to this fallacy. In
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,168 Justice Scalia describes a presumption
against generality when addressing the problem of multiple descriptions inherent in a search for a fundamental right.
We do not understand why, having rejected our focus upon the
societal tradition regarding the natural father’s rights vis-à-vis a
child whose mother is married to another man, Justice Brennan
would choose to focus instead upon “parenthood.” Why should
the relevant category not be even more general—perhaps “family relationships”; or “personal relationships”; or even “emotional attachments in general”? Though the dissent has no basis
for the level of generality it would select, we do: We refer to the
most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified. If,
for example, there were no societal tradition, either way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from,
the traditions regarding natural fathers in general. But there is
such a more specific tradition, and it unqualifiedly denies protection to such a parent . . . .
Because such general traditions provide such imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society’s views. The need, if arbitrary decisionmaking is to be
avoided, to adopt the most specific tradition as the point of reference—or at least to announce . . . some other criterion for
selecting among the innumerable relevant traditions that could
be consulted—is well enough exemplified by the fact that in the
present case . . . both [Justices] appeal to tradition, but on the
basis of the tradition they select reach opposite results. Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of leaving
167. Anything short of what is necessary to the outcome of the case becomes mere
dicta.
168. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated
occurs, a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.169

Justice Scalia calls for the most specific formulation of the fundamental right possible.170 A court faced with a modestly theorized
precedent that found a fundamental right in other contexts will
find it improbable that the most specific characterization of the
right it is searching for will match up with the particulars of prior
cases. The assumption is that by reading fewer rights into the Due
Process Clause, a court is exercising judicial restraint or at least
protecting against judicial activism. Should the court decide, however, that the case at hand warrants constitutional protection, it
will have to begin conceptual ascent to analogize between a theoretically modest precedent (or history and tradition) and the case
at hand.171
Once the process of conceptual ascent begins, it becomes difficult to curtail the principles that the court can legitimately attach to
precedent when construing them. Dworkin notes that Sunstein requires that courts utilize mid-level or low-level principles rather
than employing high-level principles. But Dworkin’s principal objection to this rejoinder is that the lines between low-level, midlevel, and high-level principles are fuzzy.172 A court cannot, therefore, decide ahead of time what kind of principles it will resort to
because the court will often find it difficult to identify whether it
has crossed the line between theoretical minimalism and ambition.
This inability to limit the scope of legal reflection ahead of time
poses the greatest criticism to Professor Sunstein’s presumption
against high-level principles. Sunstein notes that “[t]he presumption against high-level theories is an aspect of the ideal of the rule
of law to the extent that it is an effort to limit the exercise of discretion at the point of application.”173
The point of application is where a court must either apply the
theory articulated in precedent or develop its own theory if the
decisions of its predecessor courts are theoretically modest.174 If
there is a sufficient gap in theorization between what the precedent
has articulated and what is required to resolve the case at hand, the
169. Id. at 127.
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., id.
172. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 69.
173. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 45.
174. Courts will sometimes begin interpretation by collecting prior precedent. See,
e.g., Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528-29 (2003).
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court must theorize at the point of application. Creating gaps that
invite theorization for the purpose of avoiding unwarranted theorization is a contradiction.
B.

Is the Inevitability of Justificatory Ascent Fatal to
Sunstein’s Regime of Theoretical Modesty?

The notion of justificatory ascent appears to be Dworkin’s analogue to conceptual ascent. Justificatory ascent occurs when one
needs to examine precedent or establish vertical and horizontal cohesion in the law prior to resolving the case at hand.175 Dworkin’s
principal argument is that one cannot draw a line in the spectrum
of theorization, after which, a court can go no further. In other
words, courts proceed in a theoretically modest fashion because
the problem at hand dictates the degree of theorization required.
Dworkin notes this objection rhetorically: “[W]hich ‘theoretical’
issues should [a judge] decline to consider, and why are these more
or differently theoretical? On what different, and less ‘completely’
theoretical basis should he decide?”176
If a judge cannot differentiate between what is to be characterized as more completely theorized and less completely theorized,
then the judge cannot determine where to stop in advance. In addition, a judge might not be able to predict to what extent a legal
issue will require theorization. A judge may not be able to determine whether she is employing high-level or low-level theories with
certainty. Also, determining the degree of theorization required to
resolve a case may not be possible until the inquiry has begun.
It is not difficult, however, to make the assumption that conceptual or justificatory ascent is inevitable. If a court chooses to proceed by analogical reasoning and only modestly theorizes each case
until it becomes necessary to provide more, then it will find a large
amount of theorization at the point of application. This may lead
to unfettered discretion in developing theory.
On the other hand, if a court confronts the need to theorize at
the point of application in each case, the court might resolve the
case with less theorization than necessary because after a certain
point more theory may seem irrelevant.177 For example, if a court
175. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 54-55.
176. See id. at 68-69.
177. See Scott J. Shapiro, Fear of Theory, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 399 (1997)
(“[J]udges rarely proffer general theories to support their rulings because such theories are scarcely relevant in adjudication.”) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 17).
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resolves a case on a theory of equal protection, then utilitarianism
or Kantianism may seem far less relevant to the inquiry.178
If a court defers theorization until conceptual ascent is absolutely necessary, a court will undergo a theoretical ascent until it
can provide the necessary analogical connection between cases.
This process may result in the court overshooting by developing far
more theory than is required to resolve the case.179 Whereas, if the
court theorized at the point of application, equilibrium is likely to
form in which additional theorization would be of no use.
Moreover, a court can constrain the mode of inquiry and the
mode of articulation in advance, which may be conducive to theoretical modesty.180 For example, by confronting the need to theorize by defining constitutional rights with particularity, the court
delineates the extent of the right derived or the constitutional provision construed.181 A court should articulate its reasons clearly.
By narrowing the proposition for which a case stands, its scope is
subject to narrower interpretation when it is used in a later case as
precedent.
Incompletely theorized agreements coupled with a presumption
against high-level theories will leave each analogy under theorized.
When conceptual ascent occurs, judicial discretion in construing
precedent is at its peak.182 Although incompletely theorized agreements, when coupled with such a presumption, do not fit well
within the realm of constitutional interpretation, the project of theoretical modesty is not indefensible. Theorization at the point of
application may facilitate theoretical modesty in the long run,183
and such theorization may comport with judicial minimalism, an
attribute especially suited to a federal judiciary of limited
jurisdiction.184

178. See id. at 400 (“But is it a violation of the categorical imperative to prevent
someone from suing a sitting president for sexual harassment? It would be futile for a
judge to invoke Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals to answer that question.”).
179. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 69.
180. See, e.g., supra note 136 and accompanying text.
181. Id.
182. This is a direct product of not knowing, a priori, how much theorization is
required to solve a particular problem.
183. This reduces the likelihood that a court will over-theorize in one swath of
theorization.
184. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 45.

\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-5\FUJ502.txt

unknown

Seq: 31

28-NOV-07

2007] INCOMPLETELY THEORIZED AGREEMENTS
IV.

11:16

1487

CONCLUSION

This Comment illustrates some barriers to Sunstein’s presumption against high-level theories and incompletely theorized agreements in constitutional law, particularly in decisions by the United
States Supreme Court. Incompletely theorized agreements cannot
rely on stare decisis to facilitate the use of analogical reasoning or
other low-level principles to resolve cases. Establishing the strong
stare decisis effect required to form the initial point of consensus
about precedent to begin the process of analogical reasoning would
require theorization about when to invoke the doctrine at all.
Supremacy allows the high court greater liberty to abrogate precedent when it finds it unworkable or unsound.185 Each decision to
apply precedent embodies a decision not to overrule it. This point
of decision requires consensus. Sunstein’s theory, which assumes
certain fixed points that are created by stare decisis effect or institutional constraints,186 fails when the possibility of revision occurs
at every point of application. Moreover, if the court were to
strengthen stare decisis, its hands would be tied when confronted
with a minute error in a line of precedent.187 Greater theorization
coupled with a weak stare decisis effect would provide the court
with more flexibility.
At some point the court will have to experience conceptual or
justificatory ascent.188 While applying precedent to the case before
it a court engages in legal reflection to explain its precedent.189
Whether the court waits to develop theory after conceptual ascent
becomes necessary, or whether it theorizes in advance, is crucial
when seeking to curtail judicial discretion. Because deferring theorization creates a greater justification to begin theorizing when a
large gap exists between the precedent and the case at hand,190 and
because it is difficult to determine whether a judge uses more or
less theorized principles,191 the potential for judicial indiscretion is
greater under Sunstein’s incompletely theorized agreements.
Moreover, a judge cannot predict when, and to what extent, justifi185. Absent supremacy the Court would be bound by a higher court or a co-equal
branch’s interpretation of the Constitution.
186. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 17.
187. Even Sunstein acknowledges that the fixed points of law that analogical reasoning is predicated on could be erroneous. See id.
188. See id. at 51.
189. See id. at 45.
190. To facilitate analogy there must be a broader theory to connect the incongruent facts of different cases.
191. See DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 69.
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catory ascent will be necessary.192 This problem makes it difficult
to draw lines in advance that a court will refuse to go past once it
begins its inquiry.
Incompletely theorized agreements are not viable in a jurisprudential climate of weak adherence to precedent and few a priori
limits on the scope of inquiry afforded a case. Theoretical modesty, however, is not indefensible. By confronting the need to theorize at the point of application in each case, a court minimizes the
justification to theorize in a later case. A court should therefore
define its holdings with particularity rather than force a successive
court to impose its own theory.193 While incompletely theorized
agreements are useful in other contexts, they provide far less utility
when the Supreme Court decides matters of constitutional import.
Many of the institutions that make such agreements work are not
in full force when the Court interprets a foundational document,
especially when the Court’s decisions are unreviewable.

192. See id at 55.
193. See Hart, supra note 67, at 610 (“Logic only tells you hypothetically that if you
give a certain term a certain interpretation then a certain conclusion follows. Logic is
silent on how to classify particulars—and this is the heart of judicial decision.”).

